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Recent studies find the socioeconomic status (SES) of a defendant’s home 
neighborhood acts as an extralegal factor in sentencing.  However, little is known 
about how movement between low-SES and high-SES neighborhoods to commit 
crimes can shape the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.  The social class of both a 
defendant’s home neighborhood and victimized neighborhood may be relevant in 
prosecutorial decision-making.  This study examines how the SES of home and 
victimized neighborhoods influences the likelihood of a defendant receiving a charge 
reduction.  Data from the New York County District Attorney’s Office provide 
detailed information on prosecution and sentencing for a large sample of criminal 
offenders, many of whom travel to commit crimes in neighborhoods other than their 
own.  Results indicate low to high moving offenders were less likely to receive a 
charge reduction.  Findings are discussed as they relate to theories of prosecutorial 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Criminologists have long been studying the influence of defendant 
characteristics in courtroom decision-making.  However, very little work considers 
the role that community level factors such as neighborhood socioeconomic status 
(SES) might play in shaping court actor decision making.  Some work is suggestive 
of a relationship.  For example, select studies report that neighborhood SES impacts 
various court decisions (Auerhahn, Henderson, McConnel, and Lockwood, 2017; 
Wooldredge and Thistlethwaite, 2004; Wooldredge, 2007).  In particular, some recent 
work indicates that defendants residing in locations with greater neighborhood 
disadvantage are more likely to receive non-suspended prison sentences 
(Wooldredge, 2007) and be fully prosecuted (Wooldredge and Thistlethwaite, 2004).  
Although research on neighborhoods socioeconomic conditions and criminal 
punishment is fairly limited, the body of research on this topic is growing and 
scholars are increasingly investigating the contextual role of community 
characteristics as an extralegal factor in court decisions.   
Much of this work suggests that criminal justice officials are influenced by 
neighborhood characteristics.  For example, Smith (1986) found police officers made 
significantly more arrests in lower income neighborhoods.  Gellar and Fagan (2010) 
found “stop and frisk” policies in New York resulted in disproportionate stops and 
searches of individuals residing in low-income non-white neighborhoods.  Similarly, 
court actors may be influenced by neighborhood SES.  For example, Wooldredge and 





fully prosecuted compared to defendants from high-income areas in a sample of 
misdemeanor assaults.  Later, Wooldredge (2007) found defendants residing in areas 
of neighborhood disadvantage experienced less favorable sentencing decisions.  
Auerhahn and colleagues (2017: 30) explained these findings by stating that the 
“spatial environment is a social signifier that influences perceptions of those who live 
and spend time there…neighborhood of residence can be a powerful social ‘marker’ 
that identifies an individual as having certain characteristics, values, and status.”  
When neighborhood characteristics such as low SES are involved in court cases, 
perceptions of class can emphasize negative stereotypes such as dangerousness 
(Auerhahn et al., 2017; Wooldredge, 2007).  Consequently, it is possible that the 
courtroom workgroup may share norms about defendants that reside in certain 
neighborhoods or victimize certain areas within the community.  For example, 
Sudnow (1965: 261) stated “knowing where an offense took place is thus, for the 
[public defender], knowledge of the likely persons involved, the kind of scene in 
which the offense occurred, and the pattern of activity characteristic of such a place.”  
The SES of the crime-targeted neighborhood may hold implications in 
courtroom decision-making as well.  Although it is widely recognized in 
environmental criminology that offenders participate in criminal activity near their 
residence (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1993; Phillips 1980), not all offenders fall 
into this category.  Offenders are differentially motivated to commit crime, and some 
may travel to neighborhoods unlike their home neighborhood where there are 
opportunities to engage in different types of criminal activity (Canter and Youngs, 





that the social class of the neighborhood in which the offense takes place, the 
victimized community, may impact court actor’s operationalization of focal concerns 
in sentencing (Omori, 2017; Williams and Rosenfeld, 2016).  For example, offenders 
who commit crimes in disadvantaged areas may be viewed as more dangerous, 
blameworthy, and threatening to the elite in society.  At the same time, affluent 
communities may establish a greater need for community protection from outsiders 
through criminal justice responses like harsher sentencing (Williams and Rosenfeld, 
2016).  However, studies that review the crime-targeted neighborhood in court cases 
are limited, speculative, and do not fully investigate neighborhoods connected to 
different types of defendants. 
At the same time, most research on extralegal factors in punishment focus 
disproportionately on the judge’s final decision without considering the discretion of 
other criminal justice actors, predominately prosecutors (Johnson, King, and Spohn, 
2016; Piehl and Bushway, 2007; Shermer and Johnson, 2010; Wright and Engen, 
2005).  More research is therefore needed to understand how the economic standing 
of both the defendant’s home and crime-targeted community impact charging 
decisions.  Kutateladze, Andiloro, Johnson, and Spohn (2014) noted the importance 
of identifying extralegal disadvantages throughout stages of criminal justice and 
conducted a study examining race in criminal case processing for defendants in New 
York County.  It was discovered that black and Latino defendants were cumulatively 
disadvantaged compared to white defendants.  Kutateladze and colleagues (2014) 





well as measures of prosecutorial discretion throughout case processing (i.e., charge 
reductions) as distinguished priorities for future sentencing research. 
This thesis answers that call by investigating whether the SES of the 
defendant’s home and crime-targeted neighborhoods act as extralegal factors that may 
disadvantage defendants during charging in New York County.  Studying this 
relationship adds to the literature in a few ways.  First, scholars argue that case 
outcomes are significantly shaped by prosecutor decisions (Piehl and Bushway, 2007; 
Shermer and Johnson, 2010; Wright and Engen, 2005).  However, much of the 
sentencing literature investigating extralegal factors focuses only on the judge’s final 
decision.  Investigating charge reductions represents a valuable approach for studying 
earlier case processes that shape criminal punishment.  Second, prosecutorial 
discretion and neighborhood SES are uniquely addressed in this study.  Past research 
shows the SES of both the defendants home and crime-targeted neighborhoods may 
add a contextual layer to how prosecutors process defendants (Auerhahn et al., 2017; 
Omori, 2017; Williams and Rosenfeld, 2016; Wooldredge and Thistlethwaite, 2004).  
Third, comprehensive data are examined from New York County District Attorney’s 
Office, which contain a large and diverse sample of offenders, many of whom travel 
to commit crimes in areas outside of their home community.  Overall, this thesis 
seeks to understand the likelihood of offenders receiving charge reductions based on 
the SES of both the offender’s residential neighborhood and crime-targeted 
neighborhood.  The next chapter reviews prior work on prosecutorial decision-
making, extralegal factors, community contexts, environmental criminology, and 





concerns and group threat theory processes, and Chapter 4 details the data and 









Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Prosecutorial Discretion and Charge Reductions 
There are a few challenges involved in studying prosecutorial discretion 
within the criminal justice system (Forst, 2010; Johnson et al., 2016; Shermer and 
Johnson, 2010).  For one, there are limited data that detail early case processing 
decisions that involve prosecutorial discretion (Forst, 2010; Johnson et al., 2016).  
Also, district attorneys may hesitate to share information about their decisions out of 
fear of political or public scrutiny (Forst, 2010; Johnson et al., 2016).  Despite these 
obstacles, studying prosecutorial discretion is important because prosecutors hold a 
uniquely powerful role in the criminal justice system. 
The influence of the prosecutor is attributable, in part, to their largely 
unchecked and unreviewable decision-making power (Frase, 2000).  Although judges 
decide the final sentence, legal scholars widely acknowledge that prosecutors often 
hold greater influence over court case dispositions.  For example, sentencing reforms 
such as mandatory minimums and changes in sentencing guidelines, intended to 
check judicial discretion, shifted the discretion from the judge to the prosecutor 
(Forst, 2010; Johnson, 2010). Therefore, understanding the role of the prosecutor is 
crucial to comprehending the court process in its entirety. 
The prosecutor’s role exists in the stages that take place prior to the judge’s 
final sentence (Forst, 2010).  These crucial decision-making points include 
determining whether to accept cases, selecting charges, and recommending sentences 
(Forst, 2010).  An important tool that prosecutors use to persuade defendants to plead 





a lesser charge in exchange for pleading guilty (Forst, 2010).  Wright and Engen 
(2005) stated that plea negotiations plays a vital role in criminal punishment because 
it often directs the final sentence.  Therefore, examining charge reductions is an 
important approach to understanding how prosecutors impact sentence severity and 
influence extralegal disparities (Nagel and Schulhofer, 1992; Piehl and Bushway, 
2007; Shermer and Johnson, 2010). 
Only a few recent studies have examined prosecutorial charge reductions, and 
often, individual measures of charge reduction vary (Albonetti, 1992; Kutateladze et 
al., 2014; Piehl and Bushway, 2007; Shermer and Johnson, 2010; Wright and Engen, 
2005).  For example, Albonetti (1992) analyzed charge decreases as reduced charges 
from a felony to a misdemeanor in a sample of Florida burglary cases.  Spohn and 
Homey (1993) operationalized charge reductions as a decrease in charge severity or 
decrease in the number of charges for defendants involved in rape cases in Detroit.  
Finally, Shermer and Johnson (2010) analyzed federal charge plea negotiations and 
reviewed charge reductions as whether a reduction took place in the statutory 
maximum between initial filing through conviction.   
Given the limited prior work on prosecutorial discretion, and the use of charge 
reductions in particular, additional work is needed to address the paucity of 
information for one of the most complex and influential actors in the criminal 
courtroom workgroup.  The limited empirical work on the topic suggests extralegal 





Extralegal-Factors and Prosecutorial Discretion 
Studies show support for extralegal factors such as defendant race, gender, 
age, and social class impacting prosecutorial decision-making.  In an early study, 
Bernstein, Kick, Leung, and Schulz (1977) found charges administered to racial 
minority defendants were more severe at later stages of case processing in a sample of 
1,435 defendants charged with robbery in a large metropolitan city.  Later, Piehl and 
Bushway (2007) compared defendants with felony charges that pled down to 
misdemeanors in both Maryland, a voluntary guideline state, and Washington, a 
presumptive guideline state.  They analyzed factors that predicted charge reductions 
and found extralegal factors (i.e., race, gender, age) explained more variance in the 
plea bargain model for the presumptive guideline state.  Specifically, prosecutors in 
Washington considered extralegal factors more often in pleas.  These results were 
interpreted as support for the hydraulic displacement hypothesis in which 
discretionary power is shifted from the judge to the prosecutor (see Miethe, 1987).  
Additionally, Shermer and Johnson (2010) found charge reductions decreased 
sentences by 19% in federal courts.  Both legal and extralegal factors were found to 
impact the likelihood of a charge reduction for drug and violent offenders.  For the 
12% of cases that involved a reduced charge, results showed charge reductions were 
favorable for offenders who were female, had serious crimes, accepted responsibility, 
and had more filing charges.  Although no main effects were revealed for race and 
ethnicity, charge reductions were less favorable for black and Hispanic offenders 





related to criminal counts, charges, and plea offers can contribute to extralegal 
disparities in criminal punishment (Spohn, 2000; Ulmer, 2012). 
Not all prior work reveals significant disparities however.  Some studies show 
extralegal factors are not linked to case processing decisions.  For example, 
Kingsnorth, Lopez, Wentworth, and Cummings (1998) reported that race did not 
influence prosecutors’ decision to dismiss cases or fully prosecute in a small sample 
of adult sexual assault cases in a California county.  Similarly, Albonetti (1992) 
reviewed a sample of burglary and robbery cases in Jacksonville, Florida and did not 
find an effect for differing initial charge offers by defendant gender and race.  Despite 
these mixed findings, more research is needed to unpack different types of extralegal 
factors that may influence prosecutors’ decisions.  
 Importantly, defendant characteristics such as socioeconomic status may 
influence the likelihood of defendants receiving a charge reduction across different 
contexts.  However, a common criticism in sentencing literature is the inability to 
disentangle racial disparity and socioeconomic factors in criminal punishment (Zatz, 
2000).  Many scholars attempt to address this limitation by including socioeconomic 
proxies such as education, employment, or attorney type (Kutateladze et al., 2014; 
Spohn, 2000; Ulmer, 2012).   
Kutateladze and colleagues (2014), for example, showed that minority 
defendants were more likely than white defendants to receive harsher outcomes 
progressively throughout criminal justice processing.  For individual level SES, 
defendants who obtained private counsel were less likely to be held in pretrial 





defendants arrested in lower-income neighborhoods were less likely to have their 
cases dismissed.  These findings offer support for individual and neighborhood SES 
impacting prosecutorial discretion.  Academics have long noted the influence of 
communities as a contextual factor in courtroom decision-making (Johnson, 2006; 
Myers and Talarico, 1987; Sudnow, 1965; Ulmer and Johnson, 2004; Wooldredge, 
2007), but very little work investigates contextual factors that may shape 
prosecutorial decision-making. 
Community Context and Criminal Punishment 
 
Sentencing scholars often discuss community context in terms of the 
courtroom workgroup.  Some of the differences in criminal punishment across courts 
are attributed to the dynamics of this group (Eisenstein, Flemming, and Nardulli, 
1988).  The workgroup, made-up of essential courtroom actors, share norms that are 
specific to each court and corresponding jurisdiction that guide decision-making 
(Ulmer, 2012).  For example, local community characteristics such as socioeconomic 
status is one factor that has been found to influence courtroom workgroup decisions 
(Ulmer, 2012).  Johnson (2005) observed a multilevel context in criminal sentencing 
with judge and county-level disparities in a sample of Pennsylvania courts.  He found 
significant differences in the likelihood of defendants receiving a guideline departure 
sentence across courtroom and community-level social environments which included 
measures such as court size, caseload pressure, and race.  Similarly, Ulmer, 
Kurlychek, and Kramer (2007) found the racial composition of communities 
influenced the application of mandatory minimums in a sample of Pennsylvania 





minority individuals received unfavorable sentence decisions compared to 
predominately white counties in Pennsylvania.  Finally, D’Alessio and Stolzenberg 
(2002) found unemployed defendants being detained more often in areas with higher 
unemployment rates across a sample of twelve urban cities.  These studies show 
courtroom decision-making varying across different social contexts including SES 
community characteristics. 
Taken together, community context including the SES of a defendant’s 
neighborhood may act as a macro-level extralegal factor that influences courtroom 
workgroup decisions.  This may occur through the courtroom workgroup sharing 
focal concerns about crimes that take place in certain areas or having stereotypes 
about defendants that reside in specific parts of the community (Sudnow, 1965; 
Suttles, 1972).  For example, defendants from marginalized communities may be 
stereotyped with criminality and future offending (Spitzer, 1975; Sudnow, 1965).  
Finally, despite the literature offering some support for the impact of social context in 
sentencing, few studies have focused on the influence of a defendant’s home 
neighborhood SES which may be particularly important for charging and sentencing 
decisions made by the courtroom workgroup (Auerhahn et al., 2017; Omori, 2017; 
Williams and Rosenfeld, 2016; Wooldredge and Thistlethwaite, 2004). 
Neighborhood SES and Criminal Punishment 
 
In one of the earliest studies of neighborhood SES and punishment, Clarke 
and Koch (1976) examined 798 burglary and larceny defendants in a North Carolina 
county.  Defendant income was measured by identifying the median income of census 





for the defendant’s race, age, and employment status on prison outcomes, but 
defendants from low-income areas were significantly more likely to be sentenced to 
prison, especially if these defendants did not obtain bail and did not have an effective 
attorney.  Overall, neighborhood level income was found to be the most influential 
variable in a defendant’s likelihood of being sentenced to prison. 
Later, Wooldredge and Thistlethwaite (2004) sought to understand disparities 
in case processing outcomes involving a defendant’s race, individual level SES, and 
neighborhood level SES.  In a sample of misdemeanor intimate assaults in Cincinnati, 
OH, African-American defendants had fared better in charging, full prosecution, and 
incarceration length, but not convictions.  Defendants who were low SES at the 
individual level and resided in low-income neighborhoods were treated more 
leniently in early stages of case processing, but were more likely to be convicted at 
later stages.  Thus, in a sample of misdemeanor intimate assault cases, neighborhood 
SES appeared to impact case processing decisions for African American defendants 
from low-income areas with these defendants receiving better outcomes in early 
charging decisions.  Wooldredge and Thistlethwaite (2004) explained these findings 
by stating that courts in disadvantaged areas are more likely to have higher crime 
rates and sentence defendants more leniently to process cases quickly to manage 
higher caseloads. 
Similarly, in a study reviewing the relationship between minimum sentence 
lengths and residential neighborhood composition measured with a social 
disorganization index including poverty, female headed households, unemployment, 





Auerhahn and colleagues (2017) found a negative relationship between neighborhood 
disadvantage and punitive sentences in a sample of 635 homicide defendants in 
Philadelphia.  Controlling for individual level SES with a measure for private 
attorney, results indicated that defendants in the sample who resided in disadvantaged 
neighborhoods received 3.3 fewer months on average compared to defendants that did 
not reside in disadvantaged neighborhoods.  In contrast, Wooldredge (2007) 
examined a sample of approximately 3,000 African American and White defendants 
charged with felonies in 24 Ohio counties to review the relationship between a 
defendant’s home neighborhood characteristics and the likelihood of sentence 
severity and imprisonment.  Wooldredge found neighborhood disadvantage was 
significantly and positively related to prison sentences.  Specifically, African 
American defendants received shorter sentences and defendants from disadvantaged 
neighborhoods received non-suspended prison sentences more often. 
Although scholars have noted that the SES of the defendant’s community is 
one intriguing factor that may influence prosecutorial discretion, these studies did not 
fully consider various neighborhoods in which the crime occurred.  For example, 
Auerhahn and colleagues did not review the crime-targeted neighborhood because 
homicides occurred in specific parts of the city and they assumed these incidents 
occurred close to where the offender resided.  However, not distinguishing offenders 
who may have committed crimes in areas that were outside of their home 
neighborhoods is one limitation to be addressed in the present study.  The court may 
take characteristics of the crime-targeted neighborhood into account in case 





perception of the harm done to the community and the social class of the community 
in which the crime was committed (Williams and Rosenfeld, 2016).  For example, 
lower class defendants may be treated more punitively if the crime-targeted 
community is part of society’s upper-class (Chambliss and Seidman, 1971). 
Therefore, the social class of the offense-targeted neighborhood and the social class 
of the neighborhood where the offender resides may both jointly affect prosecutorial 
decision making. 
Overall, court actor’s perceptions may lead to contextual level disparities in 
case processing for offenders committing crimes in different SES neighborhoods.  
The present study will review contextual differences in charging across 
neighborhoods in one county by examining the intersection of SES and charging 
decisions made by prosecutors.  However, to fully understand these macro-level 
disparities in court decisions, it is important to consider the characteristics of both the 
offender’s home neighborhood and crime-targeted neighborhood.  Related work in 
environmental criminology provides a useful lens for considering this intersection. 
Environmental Criminology and Criminal Punishment 
 
An offender’s home neighborhood and crime-targeted location have largely 
been discussed in environmental criminology as the physical spaces within an 
offender’s journey to criminal opportunity (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1993; 
Rengert, 2004).  An offender’s journey encompasses three basic elements: the starting 
location or anchor point, the direction in which the offender moves toward the crime, 





purposes of this thesis, research on the distance traveled to criminal opportunity is 
briefly discussed to elaborate upon the anchor point and crime-targeted location. 
First, the literature has predominately noted that offenders do not travel very 
far from their anchor point.  In other words, offenders are more likely to commit 
crimes near their place of residence (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1993; Phillips 
1980; Rengert, 2004).  This is known as the distance decay function which explains 
that the farther away offenders move from their home, a place of familiarity, the less 
likely offenders are to commit a crime.  Although the distance decay function is 
widely agreed upon, some scholars discuss the possibility of offenders traveling 
farther away to commit crimes in different communities compared to their home 
community (Canter and Youngs, 2008; Koppen and Keijser, 1997; Rhodes and 
Conley, 2008). 
Second, understanding community characteristics are important when 
reviewing criminal patterns such as the suitable target or neighborhood in which the 
crime is aimed from the anchor point (Rengert, 2004).  Specific areas may be 
considered “attractive” for criminal activity.  For example, offenders may target areas 
where fear of crime is low such as busy shopping streets, student unions, or parking 
lots (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1993).  Crimes in these areas may be offense-
specific and occur at different times throughout the day.  For instance, researchers 
have noted hot spots for thefts exist at subway exits or bus stops when traffic flow is 
high (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1993).  Accordingly, criminal activity is most 
noted in areas aligning with the daily routine activities of offenders and community 





offenders may engage in criminal activity in ecologically different places relative to 
their home neighborhood based on opportunities to commit specific offense types 
(Canter and Youngs, 2008; Clarke and Felson, 1993; Hipp, 2016; Rhodes and Conley, 
2008).  
Offenders motivated to travel to commit crimes in different neighborhoods 
mainly search for criminal attractors and opportunities to engage in predetermined 
criminal activity (Canter and Youngs, 2008; Clarke and Felson, 1993; Rhodes and 
Conley, 2008).  For example, crimes take place on physical or perceived edges where 
change from one community to another is apparent.  These include parks, commercial 
areas, sides of diverse roads, ethnic boundaries in cities, as well as places between 
neighborhoods of different social status (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1991).  
However, other criminal attractors include areas that are heavy commercial districts, 
often located near poor neighborhoods, where offenders may be motivated to travel a 
long distance to commit crimes.  For example, an offender may be interested in 
committing an instrumental offense like a theft or drug deal in a certain district where 
the payoff is worth the distance traveled to an area that is different from their home 
neighborhood (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1993; Canter and Youngs, 2008; 
Rhodes and Conley, 2008).  Therefore, upper and lower-class neighborhoods offer 
opportunities for different types of crime.  This may allow for varying levels of 
offender motivation to travel outside of home communities.  
Finally, criminal punishment is typically discussed in environmental 
criminology as restorative justice to the environment of the victimized community.  





justice is pursued when the environment is purposefully damaged.  White (2010: 372) 
stated “not only do the powerful have greater scope to shape laws in their collective 
interest, they have greater capacity to defend themselves individually if they do break 
and bend the existing rules and regulations.”  Consequently, when offenders travel to 
commit crimes in different ecological places, the level of punishment may change 
depending on the context of the victimized neighborhood (D’Alessio and 
Stolzenberg, 2002; Spohn, 2000; Spohn and Fornango, 2009; Ulmer, 2012).  For 
example, some work suggests that the race of the defendant becomes more salient in 
areas experiencing greater poverty and growth in minority populations.  Johnson, 
Stewart, Pickett, and Gertz (2011) found that respondents provided greater support 
for the use of ethnicity in sentencing in areas where Latinos were perceived to be 
criminally and economically more threatening.  Thus, it is possible that judges and 
prosecutors may treat offenders from low-income areas more punitively if those 
offenders victimize higher income neighborhoods (Hawkins, 1987; Williams and 
Rosenfeld, 2016).  Only recently, have scholars begun to focus on the ecological 
context of the offender’s crime-targeted neighborhood in sentencing decisions 
(Omori, 2017; Williams and Rosenfeld, 2016).   
The Role of SES in Crime-Targeted Neighborhoods 
 
Relatively few studies have directly investigated the importance of 
neighborhood socioeconomic status in sentencing.  Table 1 summarizes the main 
findings of recent studies that examine neighborhood SES and criminal punishment.  
In a study reviewing both neighborhood disadvantage and racial make-up of the 





American Community Survey taken by the US Census to determine whether the 
crime-targeted neighborhood characteristics, mostly racial composition, influenced 
sentencing outcomes for 17,298 felony drug defendants in Sacramento, California.  
Defendants arrested in black communities were more likely to have higher prison 
sentences, as well as a lower rate of fine and probation sentences.  Defendants 
arrested in Latino communities showed similar results, however, higher probation 
sentences were more likely and initial filing strongly impacted sentence decisions.  
More relatedly, the most consistent and significant variable to affect both sentence 
rates and sentence length was neighborhood disadvantage.  Defendants arrested in 
areas that had greater socioeconomic disadvantage including unemployment, poverty, 
single parent households, and median household income had higher rates of 
convictions across jail, fines, and probation sentences.  Also, crime-targeted 
neighborhoods with higher rates of disadvantage and ethnic/racial composition 
resulted in greater rates of convictions for felony drug offenders.  It is important to 
note that this study focused mostly on racial composition and did not review the 
economic disadvantage of the home neighborhood in comparison to the arrest 
neighborhood. 
Table 1. Neighborhood SES and Sentencing Studies 





2017 636 Philadelphia 
homicide defendants  




Defendants from disadvantaged 
neighborhoods received lenient 
sentences. 
Omori 2017 317 felony 
defendants in 
Sacramento, CA 




Socioeconomic disadvantage was 
most consistent finding for 
sentence rates and lengths. 
Williams & 
Rosenfeld 
2016 136 black males; 79 





Black males arrested in high 







bail amounts and spent more time 
in jail/prison. 






Felons from low SES 
neighborhoods were more likely 












Black males from disadvantaged 
areas were less likely to be 
charged, but more likely to be 
fully prosecuted compared to 
white offenders. 
 
Similarly, Williams and Rosenfeld (2016) conducted a study identifying a 
small sample of black male offenders charged with firearm possession in a large 
Midwestern city to understand the influence of both SES and racial composition of 
the crime-targeted neighborhood on case processing decisions.  Racial composition 
did not have an effect on pretrial detention, bail amount, or sentence, however, 
neighborhood SES impacted the likelihood of prison sentences through a mediated 
relationship between the final bail amount, pretrial confinement, and neighborhood 
affluence.  Williams and Rosenfeld (2016) found black defendants arrested in higher 
income neighborhoods were more likely to be sentenced to prison than defendants 
arrested in lower income neighborhoods.  These results were explained by focal 
concerns and group threat theory implying that legal actors offer more protection to 
higher-class communities because crimes committed by subordinate lower-class 
members are perceived to be a greater threat to higher-class communities (Hawkins, 
1987; Williams and Rosenfeld, 2016).   
In sum, there is some evidence that neighborhood SES may play a role in 
court decisions.  Examining the SES of neighborhoods involved in criminal cases can 
help to identify contextual sentencing disparities.  There is empirical support for the 





neighborhood separately influencing court decisions, but no studies to date have 
attempted to review the SES of both neighborhoods potential impact on early case 
processing. This thesis expands upon current attempts to review the SES of the 
neighborhoods involved in criminal cases by investigating whether the SES of both 
the offender’s home neighborhood and victimized neighborhood (i.e., offenders from 
low SES neighborhoods committing crimes in high SES neighborhoods) impacts 






Chapter 3: Theory and Hypotheses  
Theory 
 The focal concerns perspective and theories of group threat processes provide 
a useful foundation for understanding criminal punishment in the context of offenders 
who commit crimes in economically different neighborhoods.  First, Steffensmeier 
and colleagues (1998) stated that judicial and prosecutorial decision-making are 
guided by focal concerns including perceived offender blameworthiness, community 
protection, and practical constraints/consequences.  First, blameworthiness refers to 
the culpability of the offender.  Court decision-makers may review biographical and 
case factors such as offense seriousness, criminal history, and the role that the 
offender played in committing the offense when evaluating perceptions of risk.  In 
contrast, biographical factors such as whether the offender had been victimized prior 
to offending can also decrease perception of risk.  Second, community protection 
considers the level of harm done to the community and involves a prediction about 
possible future offending and dangerousness of the offender.  The more uncertainty 
decision-makers have about the future offending behavior of the defendant, the more 
likely biographical factors will be taken into consideration.  Finally, practical and 
organizational constraints as well as offender consequences encompass the third 
focal concern.  Examples include courtroom relationships, available resources, 
perceived offender ability to be incapacitated, and local community norms and 
politics. 
Steffensmeier and colleagues stated that judges, prosecutors, and other court 





about the offense and defendant.  This is known as the “perceptual shorthand” in the 
sentencing process which becomes problematic when the decisions of the judge and 
prosecutor are linked to extralegal factors such as race, gender, or social class.  For 
example, unemployed young minority male offenders may be sentenced more harshly 
than other offenders because of stereotypes that have been attributed to this 
marginalized group (Chiricos and Bales, 1991; Spitzer, 1975).  Therefore, court 
actors may connect class stereotypes to case characteristics such as the SES of either 
the defendant’s home community or crime-targeted neighborhood in the perceptual 
shorthand process. 
Judges and prosecutors may utilize defendant’s individual and neighborhood 
characteristics in the perceptual shorthand process when deciding to charge or 
sentence defendants (Auerhahn et al., 2017; Omori, 2017; Williams and Rosenfeld, 
2016; Wooldredge, 2007; Wooldredge and Thistlethwaite, 2004).  For example, 
societal expectations of norms and behaviors are associated with demographic 
characteristics, “types” or “scripts,” which impacts how individuals across different 
social classes are treated (Harris, 1977, Harris and Hill, 1986).  These characteristic 
differences involve neighborhood traits.  Sudnow (1965: 261) stated that the 
courtroom workgroup applies “going rates” for stereotypical offenders, but also 
considers crime to be “ecologically” specified.  Court actors remember certain 
neighborhoods as hot spots for criminal activity and other areas are considered to 
have relatively little crime (Sudnow, 1965).  These opinions created from court 
actor’s cognitive mapping and impressions of different parts of the city can influence 





defendants from neighborhoods with higher rates of minorities, unemployment, 
poverty, and crime to be more dangerous or at risk of future offending (Krivo and 
Peterson, 1996; Sudnow, 1965; Wooldredge, 2007).  When this occurs, prosecutors 
may be less likely to reduce charges for these offenders because of negative 
stereotypical imagery tied to individuals from lower-status urban neighborhoods 
(Harris, 1977, Harris and Hill, 1986; Sudnow, 1965; Suttles, 1972; Wooldredge, 
2007).  Differently, offenders who reside in higher-income communities may be 
considered archetypal countertypes (Harris, 1977; see also: Sealock and Simpson, 
1998) who are characteristically different from the stereotypical offenders who are 
considered young, minority, males from low SES areas.  These characteristic 
differences may play a role in prosecutors charging decisions with offenders from 
high-income areas being treated leniently because these offenders are countertype to 
the negative stereotypes of offenders from low income areas (Harris and Hill, 1986; 
Hill, et al., 1985).  Overall, offender ‘types’ and the way their neighborhoods are 
remembered within court actor’s cognitive maps can influence charge offers and 
sentence recommendations (Harris and Hill, 1986; Wooldredge, 2007). 
Relatedly, conflict theories offer a theoretical explanation specific to 
understanding the SES of both the defendant’s home and crime-targeted 
neighborhoods impacting prosecutorial decision-making.  To begin with, conflict 
theorists maintain that the economic elite hold power in a capitalist society by 
keeping marginalized groups oppressed (Chambliss and Seidman, 1982; Liska, 1992; 
Spitzer, 1975).  These principles, founded in Marxism, explicitly state that individuals 





group threat theories, rooted in broader conflict perspectives, have predominately 
focused on racial and economic stratification or the threat of racial minorities and the 
poor on the economically powerful white elite.  Specifically, economic stratification 
in society is violated by poor individuals committing crimes against the upper class 
(Liska, 1992; Spitzer, 1975).  When this occurs, social control of lower class 
individuals takes place in the legal system to protect elite capitalist interests from the 
low-income groups or “social dynamite” (Spitzer, 1975: 646).  For instance, 
Chambliss and Seidman (1982) stated that economic inequality in society perpetuates 
a threat to the dominant upper class or the political and economic elite and the legal 
system is utilized to maintain the status quo.  Overall, there are severe criminal 
sanctions reserved to individuals in the lower class who are perceived as a threat to 
those in the upper class (Chambliss and Seidman, 1971; Liska, 1992; Spitzer, 1975).   
Hawkins (1987) extended these arguments to include victim characteristics 
and posited that social class differences in criminal punishment such as the race of the 
victim influences perceptions of threat to social norms in society.  Literature 
reviewing cross-class differences in sentencing between the suspect and victim have 
primarily focused on racial differences (Hawkins, 1987; Kleck, 1981; Stolzenberg, 
D'Alessio, and Eitle, 2004).  Most notably, studies identify black offenders who 
victimized whites were treated more harshly, specifically in capital punishment cases 
(Baldus, Woodworth, and Pulaski, 1990; Baldus, Woodworth, Young, and Christ, 
2001; Kleck, 1981; Paternoster and Brame, 2003, 2008; Williams and Holocomb, 
2001).  Paternoster (1984) found similar results when investigating factors that 





homicide cases in South Carolina.  The victim’s race was significantly related to the 
prosecutor’s decision to seek the death penalty.  Specifically, in cases with a black 
suspect and white victim, compared to other same-race and cross-race suspect-victim 
dyads, the death penalty was most likely to be requested by the prosecutor.  The death 
penalty was sought three times more often for white victims, members of the elite 
group in society, compared to black victims, part of the marginalized population.  
Hawkins (1987) utilized group threat processes to explain these findings and stated 
that crimes involving a black perpetrator and white victim violates society’s social 
order of powerful white elites being privileged over poor minorities.   
At the same time, related work suggests that white offenders may be protected 
against criminal punishment when their cases involve black victims, because violent 
crimes committed against black victims are discounted or viewed as less serious than 
crimes involving white victims (Hawkins, 1987; Kleck, 1981; Stolzenberg, D'Alessio, 
and Eitle, 2004).  These findings on cross-race victim-perpetrator differences in 
criminal punishment allude to the idea that other cross-class differences exist such as 
the impact of the defendant’s home neighborhood SES and victimized neighborhood 
SES.  For instance, the community context where the crime occurred may play a part 
in criminal justice case processing with court actors considering greater community 
protection for defendants from higher status neighborhoods compared to defendants 
from lower status areas (Williams and Rosenfeld, 2016). 
Taken together, there is theoretical support for the differential treatment of 
defendants according to community context (Omori 2017; Williams and Rosenfeld, 





by society’s normative social conditions, that impact the appearance of focal concerns 
in punishment (Hawkins, 1987; Kleck, 1981).  Court actors, members of the elite 
group in society, may administer stricter criminal sanctions to members of 
marginalized groups who threaten economically elite communities (Williams and 
Rosenfeld, 2016).  In contrast, offenders from high-income areas who victimize low-
income neighborhoods may be treated less severely in sentencing because these 
crimes do not go against the socially conditioned norms in society (Hawkins, 1987; 
Williams and Rosenfeld, 2016: 385).  Furthermore, literature concerning social class 
differences in criminal punishment tend to show unfavorable outcomes for 
marginalized members and favorable outcomes for members of the powerful upper 
class (Baldus, Woodworth, and Pulaski, 1990; Baldus, Woodworth, Young, and 
Christ, 2001; Paternoster and Brame, 2003, 2008; Kleck, 1981; Williams and 
Holocomb, 2001).  Likewise, prosecutorial decision-making may vary when 
prosecutors review the class differences of the victimized neighborhood in relation to 
the defendant’s home neighborhood.  Consequently, the SES of neighborhoods 
involved in criminal cases are predicted to act as an extralegal factor in prosecutorial 
decision-making.  
Hypotheses 
 Based on past research and theoretical perspectives, the SES of both the 
defendant’s home neighborhood and victimized neighborhood can impact 
prosecutorial discretion and criminal punishment (Auerhahn et al., 2017; Omori, 
2017; Williams and Rosenfeld, 2016; Wooldredge, 2007; Wooldredge and 





influence the likelihood of a charge reduction.  In particular, I expect that offenders 
from low-income areas will be treated more punitively.  Utilizing focal concerns, 
prosecutors may hold negative stereotypes about defendants from low income 
neighborhoods as being more dangerous and blameworthy (Harris and Hill, 1986; 
Hill, et al., 1985; Sudnow, 1965; Suttles, 1972; Wooldredge, 2007).  Also, offenders 
from low-income neighborhoods may be viewed as “social dynamite” that threaten 
the upper class, leading them to be processed more harshly through the legal system 
(Chambliss and Seidman, 1971; Chiricos and Bales, 1991; Liska, 1992; Spitzer, 
1975). Thus, existing theoretical perspectives suggest that court actors may stereotype 
low-income individuals as more culpable and threatening to the elite (Karp and Clear, 
2000; Steffensmeier et al., 1998).  As such, it is predicted that low-income defendants 
will be less likely to receive a charge reduction. 
 Hypothesis 1: Offenders who reside in low-income areas will be less likely to 
receive a charge reduction. 
 Second, integrating conflict perspectives with focal concerns theory suggests 
that high-income offenders may be viewed as less blameworthy and less dangerous 
because they are part of the elite class (Chambliss and Seidman, 1971; Liska, 1992; 
Spitzer, 1975).  Compared to low-income offenders, crimes committed by high-
income individuals may be viewed as countertype offenders who do not fit the 
stereotypical offender script (Harris and Hill, 1986; Hill, et al., 1985; see also: 
Sealock and Simpson, 1998), and they may appear to be less damaging to the social 
order in society (Hawkins, 1987; Farrell and Holmes, 1991).  Relatedly, prosecutors 





future offending (Sudnow, 1965; Suttles, 1972).  Thus, it is hypothesized that 
offenders who reside in the highest socioeconomic status neighborhoods will be more 
likely to receive a charge reduction. 
 Hypothesis 2: Offenders who reside in high-income areas will be more likely 
to receive a charge reduction. 
 In addition, there are theoretical reasons to expect that court actors may be 
influenced by both the home and crime-targeted neighborhoods of offenders.  Both 
focal concerns and group threat processes suggest that the community context of the 
home and crime-targeted neighborhoods may play a role in case processing.  
Applying group threat perspectives, the perceived threat and need for community 
protection may be more pronounced in higher SES neighborhoods for crimes 
committed by individuals from lower-income neighborhoods (Chambliss and 
Seidman, 1971; Liska, 1992; Williams and Rosenfeld, 2016).  Utilizing focal 
concerns, prosecutors may view culpability and community protection differently 
depending on the SES of both the defendant’s home and crime-targeted communities.  
This can lead to a perceptual shorthand based on class-related stereotypes that may 
result in a smaller likelihood of reduced charges for low income offenders committing 
crimes in higher income communities.  In particular, low-income offenders who 
commit crimes against high-income communities are likely to be perceived as out of 
place (Harris and Hill, 1986) and may be considered special threats to elite interests 
(Hawkins, 1987; Stolzenberg, D'Alessio, and Eitle, 2004).  Members from 
marginalized groups who victimize high-income neighborhoods will likely be viewed 





Therefore, offenders from low-income areas who commit crimes in high-income 
neighborhoods may be less likely to receive a charge reduction.  
 Hypothesis 3: Offenders who travel from low-income to high-income areas to 
commit crimes will be less likely to receive a charge reduction. 
 Finally, these same theoretical perspectives suggest that offenders from high 
income areas who victimize low-income neighborhoods may be treated less 
punitively because of upper-class advantages over marginalized groups (Hawkins, 
1987).  Crimes committed against marginalized members of society are often 
discounted (Hawkins, 1987; Kleck, 1981).  In other words, high-income offenders, 
part of the elite group in society, may be viewed as less culpable when the victim is 
part of a low-income group that is not protected by elite interests (Hawkins, 1987; 
Kleck, 1981).  Also, high-income individuals offending in low-income areas may be 
countertype to the stereotypical low-income offender which could potentially result in 
lenient charging (Harris and Hill, 1986; Hill, et al., 1985).  Therefore, prosecutors 
who are members of the elite group in society will be more likely to reduce charges 
for individuals from high-income neighborhoods who victimize low-income 
neighborhoods. 
 Hypothesis 4: Offenders who travel from high-income to low-income areas to 
commit crimes will be more likely to receive a charge reduction. 
 These hypotheses are tested using unique data from New York County that 
include information on both the home location of offenders and the neighborhoods 
where they committed their crime.  The data, sample and analytical strategy are 





Chapter 4: Data and Method 
Current Research Context 
 
Data are utilized from the New York County District Attorney’s Office 
(DANY) which includes over 500 assistant district attorneys (ADAs) and nearly 
100,000 cases processed annually (Kutateladze et al., 2014).  DANY consists of two 
offices located in Harlem and lower Manhattan (main office).1  Cases are originally 
brought to the DANY’s Early Case Assessment Bureau (ECAB) where ADAs decide 
to accept or decline cases (Kutateladze et al., 2014).  When cases are accepted, ADAs 
decide what charges to bring against the defendant which may increase or decrease in 
severity during processing. 
 These data were collected over a 20-month period from 2010-2011 in 
partnership with the Vera Institute of Justice (VERA) to analyze factors that influence 
discretionary decision making in case processing.  These data include N = 122,695 
offenders consisting of 91,518 misdemeanors and 16,093 felonies.2  This study will 
focus on offenders who travel to different income neighborhoods to commit crimes.3  
For offenders who travel to different zip codes, approximately 73.07% (n = 46,829) 
of offenders with known home zip codes travel to different income zip codes to 
commit crimes.  The DANY partnership with attorneys and researchers in the 
                                                 
1 DANY offices appear to be community based in which resources are provided to the residents that 
live near the office locations (Manhattan District Attorney’s Office, 2018). In 2015, DANY opened a 
Washington Heights Office location in northern Manhattan (Manhattan District Attorney’s Office, 
2018). 
2 The original data include 222,542 offenders. However, after accounting for cases that were adjourned 
in contemplation of dismissal (ACD), declined for prosecution, and dismissed, there are 122,695 
offenders. 






collection process allows for unique and comprehensive data that provide more 
information on decision making points and case outcomes in a large and diverse 
sample of offenders in an urban city in the Northeast.   
Dependent and Independent Variables 
Dependent Variable: Charge Reduction 
The dependent variable, charge reduction, is measured by examining whether 
the seriousness of charge(s) are reduced from initial screening and arraignment to 
disposition (see Kutateladze and Andiloro, 2014: 212; Kutateladze, Andiloro, and 
Johnson, 2016: 407).  It is operationalized as a dichotomous variable and measured as 
“1” if the defendant received a charge reduction and “0” if the defendant did not 
receive a charge reduction. 
Independent Variables 
 
The primary independent variables focus on neighborhood SES.  
Neighborhood SES is measured as the median income of the zip code in New York 
County.4  The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) (2011) 
calculated the Area Median Income (AMI) in New York City.  HUD (2011: 8) 
defined very low-income families as “…families whose incomes do not exceed 50 per 
centum of the median family income.”  In the present study, this is the threshold used 
to calculate low income.  Low income is calculated as up to $40,900, moderate 
income is measured between $40,900 and $98,160, and high income is above 
                                                 
4 In these data, there are approximately 60 home and arrest zip codes. The average population of the 
top ten arrest zip codes is 45,059 people. Because of the high concentration of individuals that live in 
Manhattan, the zip codes are smaller per square mile (approximately 1.26 square miles) compared to 
the average zip code size in the US (approximately 90 square miles). Therefore, although census tracts, 
approximately 0.1 square miles (Federal Communications Commission, 2015), are not utilized in this 





$98,160.5  Figure 1 displays a map of the median household income in New York 
County (Manhattan) by zip code. 
 Figure 1. Median Household Income - New York County, 2011 
 
 
For the present study, four different measures of neighborhood SES are 
examined.  First, low home is measured as “1” for offenders who reside in low 
median income neighborhoods and “0” if offenders do not reside in low median 
income neighborhoods.  Second, high home is measured as “1” for offenders who 
reside in high median income neighborhoods and “0” if offenders do not reside in 
                                                 
5 For a four-person household in New York City in 2011, very low-income is $40,900 (50% of AMI) 
and low-income is calculated up to $65,450 (80% of AMI).  Moderate-income is between $65,450 and 
$98,160.  High-income is above $98,160.  However, since these present data are skewed with most 
offenders from very low-income areas, the income range is identified as HUD’s very low income 
measured as low income, HUD’s high income as high income, and moderate income between HUD’s 





high median income neighborhoods.  Third, low to high and high to low are two 
dummy variables that measure offenders who travel to either a low or high median 
income neighborhood (relative to the low or high median income of their home 
neighborhood) to commit crimes.  Specifically, low to high-income equals “1” when 
offenders live in a low median income neighborhood and travel to a high median 
income area to offend.  Inversely, high to low-income equals “1” when offenders who 
reside in high median income areas commit crimes in low median income 
neighborhoods.  Finally, two variables are created to account for offenders who travel 
to other and travel to similar income areas.  People who travel to other income areas 
are coded “1” for offenders who are not in the low-to-high or high-to-low offender 
categories but still travelled outside their own income areas to commit a crime (i.e., 
low to middle, middle to low, high to middle, and middle to high).6  Offenders who 
travel to similar income locations are coded “1” when individuals commit crimes in 
neighborhoods with the same or similar income as their home neighborhood income 
(i.e., low to other low, middle to other middle, and high to other high). 
Legal Variables 
 
Several variables are used to control for legal characteristics.  The defendant’s 
number of charges and criminal counts, recorded at screening, are included as 
continuous variables.  Also, the statutory severity of the criminal offense is controlled 
by measuring the top charge.  First charge category (violation, infraction, 
misdemeanor, felony) and class type (violations/infractions, felony E, D, C, B, A) are 
                                                 
6 Low to high and high to low are excluded from this variable because these interactions are already 





measured at screening.  One dummy variable is created to account for each felony 
(class A to class E felonies), misdemeanor (class A and class B misdemeanors).  The 
reference category is violations and infractions.  Additionally, the type of offense is 
controlled for using three dummy variables: person, property, and drug offenses.  The 
omitted reference category is other offenses.7  The defendant’s criminal history is 
operationalized by the number of prior arrest(s) and prior prison sentence(s) (see 
Kutateladze and Andiloro, 2014: 33).  Both prior arrests and prior prison sentences 
are commonly measured in studies as indicators for defendant prior record (Welch, 
Gruhl, and Spohn, 1984).  Bench warrants, a document that is issued when the 
defendant does not show up to their court date, is included as a control and indicator 
for flight risk.  Moreover, prosecutor caseload is a continuous variable that measures 
the number of open cases assigned to the assistant district attorney (ADA) at 
arraignment.  Other legal variables include whether the defendant was in pretrial 
detention (1 = yes, 0 = no) and whether the defendant obtained private counsel (1 = 
yes, 0 = no). 
Extralegal Variables 
 
The extralegal variables are demographic measures including race, age, and 
gender.  Race is operationalized into four dummy variables including black, Hispanic, 
                                                 
7 Missing cases for offense type (n=14,575) are combined with “other” offense types to prevent the 
loss of cases.  Felony offense types and statutory levels overlapped, so broader offenses such as 
person, property, drug, and other categories were included in these data to capture statutory severity 
(see Kutateladze, Andiloro, Johnson, and Spohn, 2014). The specific offenses included in each 
category are available in the following statutes: Person offenses—New York Penal Law §120.00–
135.75 (Title H); property offenses—§140.00–165.74 (Title I and Title J); drug offenses—§220.00–
221.55 (Title M), and offenses grouped in the “other” category include Title K (fraud), Title L (official 
misconduct, bribery, perjury, judicial proceedings), M2 (gambling, prostitution, obscenity), N (public 






Asian, and other.8  White is the reference category.  Defendant’s age is a continuous 
variable measured at disposition.  Gender is coded as a dummy variable using “1” for 
male and “0” for female.   
Analytic Strategy 
To test the hypotheses, a logistic regression is used to determine the effect of 
defendant SES and offenders traveling from low to high and high to low-income 
neighborhoods on the likelihood of receiving a charge reduction.  Since the dependent 
variable is binary with “1” indicating charge reduction and “0” indicating no 
reduction, a logistic regression is utilized.  The logistic regression technique 
calculates the log odds of an event occurring.  The equation below shows the impact 
of the main independent variables and control variables on the likelihood of a 
defendant receiving a reduced charge.  In the equation, j stands for charge reduction, 
the dependent variable, and the log odds of the charge reduction are predicted with 




) = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑥1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘 +  𝜀 
The covariates include the main independent variables and controls for legal 
and extralegal factors.  There are three models with different independent variables.  
Model 1 includes variables for offenders who reside in low home and high home 
income areas.  Model 2 includes interaction terms for offenders who travel from low 
to high and high to low income locations.  Model 3 adds additional controls to capture 
offenders who travel to other income areas and offenders who travel to similar 
                                                 
8 Defendants in the “other” race category are identified as either “American Indian” or defendants with 





income areas to commit crimes.9  These variables are included to account for the 
possibility of all offenders who travel could be viewed differently by prosecutors 
when deciding charge reductions. 
Finally, standard errors are clustered around prosecutors because some 
attorneys may be consistently more or less likely to reduce charges than other 
attorneys.  For example, defendants handled by the same prosecutor are likely to have 
similar outcomes, and this is accounted for by clustering on DANY’s assistant district 
attorneys (ADAs) identification numbers provided in these data.  Descriptive 
statistics and results of multivariate analyses are reported in the next chapter,  
Chapter 5.
                                                 
9 The reference category for Model 3 is offenders who commit crimes in their own neighborhoods (i.e., 









The goal of this study is to examine the likelihood of a charge reduction for 
offenders who commit crimes in economically different neighborhoods in New York 
County.  Table 2 reports correlation coefficients for all main independent variables, 
and this suggests there are no concurringly high correlations.  Table 3 shows the 
descriptive statistics for all variables.  There are 55% of offenders who received a 
charge reduction between screening and disposition.  Approximately 15% of 
offenders were held in pretrial detention.  Offenders have an average of 1.82 charges 
and 1.96 counts.  Most offenders in these data were charged with a misdemeanor, 
70% with a Class A misdemeanor and 9% with a Class B misdemeanor.  For offense 
types, 6% committed person-related offenses, 36% involved property, and 21% 
engaged in drug crimes.  The average amount of prior arrests is 3.19.  Most offenders 
in the sample are minority males approximately 35 years of age. 
Table 2. Correlations between the Dependent Variable and Main Independent Variables 
Measures 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 
1. Charge Reduced 1.000 — — — — — — — — 
2. Low Home -0.043 1.000 — — — — — — — 
3. High Home -0.011 -0.308 1.000 — — — — — — 
4. Low Arrest -0.046 0.369 -0.115 1.000 — — — — — 
5. High Arrest 0.031 -0.148 0.254 -0.300 1.000 — — — — 
6. Low to High 0.007 0.141 -0.043 -0.182 0.606 1.000 — — — 
7. High to Low -0.011 -0.153 0.497 0.119 -0.036 -0.022 1.000 — — 
8. Traveled to Other -0.007 -0.051 0.020 -0.338 0.027 -0.127 -0.082 1.000 — 








Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean (SD) 
  All Cases 
n = 59, 685 
Low Home 
n = 39,999 
High Home 
n = 3,440 
Low to High 
n = 2,043 
High to Low  
n = 893 
Dependent Variable                     
Charge Reduced 0.55 (0.50) 0.54 (0.50) 0.53 (0.50) 0.58 (0.49) 0.52 (0.50) 
Independent Variables 
          
Low Home 0.62 (0.48) — — — — — — — — 
High Home 0.05 (0.23) — — — — — — — — 
Low to High 0.03 (0.18) — — — — — — — — 
High to Low 0.01 (0.12) — — — — — — — — 
Travel to Other 0.33 (0.47) — — — — — — — — 
Travel to Similar 0.36 (0.48) — — — — — — — — 
Legal Variables 
          
   Pretrial Detention 0.15 (0.36) 0.16 (0.36) 0.18 (0.39) 0.18 (0.39) 0.15 (0.36) 
   Bench Warrant(s)  0.10 (0.30) 0.10 (0.30) 0.08 (0.28) 0.10 (0.29) 0.08 (0.28) 
   Prosecutor Caseload 135.13 (100.51) 135.31 (100.11) 131.10 (101.15) 128.67 (99.29) 133.90 (101.31) 
   Private Counsel 0.03 (0.18) 0.02 (0.15) 0.07 (0.25) 0.03 (0.17) 0.05 (0.21) 
Charging Characteristics  
          
   Number of Charges 1.82 (0.83) 1.80 (0.83) 1.86 (0.86) 1.99 (0.77) 1.86 (0.84) 
   Number of Counts 1.96 (2.45) 1.93 (2.69) 2.06 (3.25) 2.18 (1.44) 2.01 (2.10) 
Statutory Severity 
          
   Class A Felony 0.001 (0.04) 0.001 (0.03) 0.002 (0.05) 0.0005 (0.02) 0.004 (0.07) 
   Class B Felony 0.03 (0.16) 0.03 (0.17) 0.03 (0.17) 0.01 (0.11) 0.03 (0.17) 
   Class C Felony 0.02 (0.12) 0.02 (0.13) 0.02 (0.13) 0.02 (0.14) 0.02 (0.13) 
   Class D Felony 0.04 (0.20) 0.04 (0.20) 0.06 (0.23) 0.08 (0.26) 0.03 (0.18) 
   Class E Felony 0.03 (0.16) 0.02 (0.15) 0.03 (0.17) 0.05 (0.22) 0.02 (0.14) 
   Class A Misdemeanor 0.70 (0.46) 0.68 (0.47) 0.70 (0.46) 0.75 (0.43) 0.73 (0.45) 
   Class B Misdemeanor 0.09 (0.29) 0.11 (0.31) 0.08 (0.27) 0.04 (0.20) 0.09 (0.28) 






          
   Person 0.06 (0.23) 0.06 (0.23) 0.09 (0.29) 0.05 (0.22) 0.08 (0.27) 
   Property 0.36 (0.48) 0.34 (0.47) 0.38 (0.49) 0.55 (0.50) 0.32 (0.47) 
   Drug 0.21 (0.41) 0.24 (0.43) 0.21 (0.41) 0.08 (0.27) 0.27 (0.44) 
   Other 0.26 (0.44) 0.26 (0.44) 0.20 (0.40) 0.21 (0.41) 0.22 (0.41) 
Prior Record 
          
   Prior Arrest(s) 3.19 (3.77) 3.43 (3.79) 3.60 (3.92) 2.85 (3.69) 3.89 (3.98) 
   Prior Prison Sentence 0.12 (0.33) 0.14 (0.34) 0.13 (0.34) 0.13 (0.34) 0.15 (0.35) 
Demographic Variables 
          
   Age 35.24 (12.67) 34.78 (12.74) 37.14 (12.88) 33.83 (12.17) 37.44 (13.20) 
   Male 0.85 (0.36) 0.86 (0.34) 0.81 (0.39) 0.81 (0.40) 0.82 (0.38) 
   White 0.10 (0.30) 0.04 (0.21) 0.27 (0.44) 0.11 (0.31) 0.21 (0.41) 
   Black 0.53 (0.50) 0.59 (0.49) 0.37 (0.48) 0.54 (0.50) 0.45 (0.50) 
   Hispanic  0.33 (0.47) 0.35 (0.48) 0.32 (0.47) 0.33 (0.47) 0.31 (0.46) 
   Asian 0.04 (0.20) 0.01 (0.10) 0.04 (0.20) 0.02 (0.13) 0.03 (0.16) 
   Other 0.001 (0.04) 0.001 (0.03) 0.002 (0.04) 0.001 (0.03) 0.001 (0.03) 
NOTE: Statistics are based on the final sample (n = 59,685) which excludes cases with missing zip codes. 






Table 3 also displays the descriptive statistics for all variables according to 
those offenders who reside in low home income areas, high home income areas, travel 
from low to high income areas, and travel from high to low income areas.  For 
offenders from low home income areas, 54% received a charge reduction.  For 
offenders from high home income areas, 53% received a charge reduction.  For 
offenders who travel, 58% of low to high moving offenders received a charge 
reduction and 52% of high to low moving offenders received charge reductions.  For 
legal variables, 18% of low to high income offenders were held in pretrial detention 
compared to 15% held in pretrial detention for high to low income offenders.  For 
high home and high to low income offenders, private counsel was obtained more 
often compared to offenders from low income areas.   
For charging characteristics, offenders who travel from low to high income 
areas to commit crimes hold a slightly higher number of both charges (n = 1.99) and 
counts (n = 2.18) than offenders who travel from high to low income areas to commit 
crimes.  Furthermore, there are little differences regarding statutory severity across 
income groups.  Offenders who travel from high to low received fewer Class A (73%) 
misdemeanors and more Class B (9%) misdemeanors than offenders who travel from 
low to high income areas.  For offense types, most low to high offenders commit 
property crimes (55%) and high to low offenders commit mostly property (32%) or 
drug (27%) offenses.  Both low home and high home offenders commit property 
crimes most often.  Considering prior record across different income groups, 
offenders who travel from high to low income areas have the most priors with 3.89 





characteristics differ slightly across offenders who commit crimes in different income 
areas relative to their home income area.  For those who travel from high to low 
income areas, offenders are 82% male, 21% white, 45% black, 31% Hispanic, and 3% 
Asian.  For those who travel from low to high income areas, offenders are 81% male, 
11% white, 54% black, 33% Hispanic, and 2% Asian. 
Figures 2 through 6 provide histograms and bar charts regarding offender’s 
home and crime-targeted area median income.  Figure 2 shows most offenders reside 
in low-income areas.  Figure 3 shows the income of the crime-targeted area is spread 
out in the distribution with some offenders committing crimes in higher median 
income areas.  Similarly, Figure 4 confirms that most offenders are from low home 
income areas (62.41%) and fewer offenders are from high home income areas 
(5.37%).  For offenders who travel to different income neighborhoods, 3.19% 
offenders travel from low to high income areas and 1.39% are high to low offenders. 
 Figure 2. Median Income of Home Zip Code 
 
NOTE: Low-income is measured as $40,900 or below. Moderate-income is between $40,900 to 
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 Figure 3. Median Income of Arrest Zip Code 
 
NOTE: Low-income is measured as $40,900 or below. Moderate-income is between $40,900 to 
$98,160.  High-income is above $98,160. 
 
 
Figure 5 provides a bar chart that displays offense type across the main 
independent variables.  Property crimes are the most common for low home, high 
home, low to high, and high to low-income offenders.  For example, for low to high 
income offenders, 55.26% committed property crimes and 7.64% committed drug 
crimes.  Also, drug (26.65%) and property (32.14%) crimes are the most common 
offense for high to low income offenders.  Moreover, Figure 6 presents a bar chart of 
the distribution of races across the main independent variables.  Offenders from low 
home income areas are 4.45% white, 59.48% black, and 34.92% Hispanic.  High 
home income offenders are 26.86% white, 36.60% black, and 32.28% Hispanic.  
Lastly, offenders who travel from low to high-income or high to low-income areas to 
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white offenders who travel from high to low-income areas compared to offenders who 
travel from low to high-income areas to commit crimes. 
Figure 4. Frequency of Low, High, Low to High, and High to Low Offenders 
 
NOTE: Middle income offenders are excluded from Figures 4 - 5. 
 
Figure 5. Frequency of Offense Types Across Low, High, Low to High, and High 
to Low Offenders 
 



















































Figure 6. Frequency of Races Across Low, High, Low to High, and High to Low 
Offenders 
 
NOTE: Asian, other-race, and middle-income are not included in the figure above. 
 
 
Also, offenders who travel to similar and other-income areas are alike across 
offense types and race.  For offenders who travel to other-income areas, 4.33% 
commit person offenses, 41.82% property crimes, and 13.26% drug offenses.  For 
offenders who travel to similar-income areas, 4.90% commit person offenses, 35.63% 
commit property crimes, and 19.84% drug offenses.  Further, offenders who travel to 
other-income areas are 10.68% white, 57.47% black, and 28.57% Hispanic.  
Offenders who travel to similar-income areas are 9.76% white, 52.08% black, and 
32.43% Hispanic. 
In sum, most offenders in these data who commit crimes in different 
neighborhoods are low-income minority offenders.  These offenders commit mainly 
property or drug crimes.  For offenders who travel to different income areas, offense 
type and race are similar.  Low to high and high to low-income offenders are mainly 
































while high to low-income offenders commit mostly property and drug crimes.  
Offenders who travel to other and similar-income areas are mostly black and Hispanic 
who commit property and drug crimes. 
Missing Data 
 
Among the 122,695 offenders in the original dataset, 58,576 are missing home 
zip codes and 191 are missing arrest zip codes.  Given the large amount of missing 
data for zip codes (n = 58,767), an attrition analysis is included to determine if these 
data are missing nonrandomly.  T-tests are conducted to understand whether zip 
codes are missing systematically (Table 4).  The results of the attrition analysis in 
Table 4 show offenders who are not missing home and arrest zip codes are slightly 
more likely to be black, Hispanic, Asian, and have more prior arrests than offenders 
who are missing zip codes.  Offenders who are missing home and arrest zip codes are 
slightly older, and more likely to be white and male.  There are no significant 
differences regarding prior prison sentences and being a member of other race.  
Finally, charge reduced is statistically significantly related to missing zip codes.  
However, it should be noted that the significance of t-tests is dependent on the sample 
size, and the current study has a very large sample size.  Practically speaking, these 
comparisons do not reveal large substantive differences.  To address missing data in 
analyses, listwise deletion was utilized to exclude cases with missing zip code 
information.   
Table 4. T-tests: Missing Home and Arrest Zip Codes 






Difference T  
Charge Reduced 0.554 0.470 0.084 29.413 *** 





Prior Prison Sentence(s) 0.123 0.126 -0.003 -1.665  
Age 35.245 36.956 -1.712 -24.268 *** 
Male 0.845 0.878 -0.033 -16.714 *** 
White 0.097 0.169 -0.072 -36.912 *** 
Black 0.531 0.507 0.024 8.395 *** 
Hispanic 0.331 0.290 0.041 15.498 *** 
Asian 0.040 0.033 0.007 6.400 *** 
Other 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.459   
Note: ***p<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05 
 
Results from Logistic Regressions 
 
The results for Models 1 through 3 are displayed in Table 5.  In Model 1 
offenders from high home and low home income areas were not statistically 
significantly different compared to offenders from middle income areas in terms of 
the likelihood of a charge reduction.10  Regarding other predictors, defendants held in 
pretrial detention were less likely to receive a charge reduction while defendants with 
one or more bench warrants were more likely to receive a charge reduction.  
Prosecutors with higher caseloads were less likely to grant charge reductions.  As 
expected, defendants who obtained private counsel were significantly more likely to 
receive a charge reduction.  Additionally, the number of charges and counts were not 
statistically significantly related to charge reductions.  For statutory severity, 
offenders of all statutory levels were more likely to receive a charge reduction 
relative to offenders charged with violations or infractions.  Offenders charged with 
felonies had higher odds of a reduced charge than offenders with misdemeanor top 
                                                 
10 In these data, offenders are nested within home neighborhoods and crime-targeted neighborhoods.  
Supplemental analyses were conducted using multilevel analysis to account for the hierarchal nature of 
these data, with the second level of analysis home neighborhoods for Model 1 and arrest 
neighborhoods for Models 2 and 3.  Results from the multilevel models produced parallel findings to 





charges.  For offense types, offenders who committed property and drug offenses 
were less likely to receive a charge reduction relative to other offenses.  Person 
offenses were not statistically significant.  Also, offenders with prior arrests and prior 
prison sentences were less likely to receive a charge reduction.  Furthermore, a one-
unit increase in an offender’s age was associated with a decreased likelihood of 
receiving a charge reduction.  Finally, males, blacks, and Hispanics were less likely to 
receive a charge reduction relative to whites, while Asians were more likely to 
receive a charge reduction.11 
The results of the second model in Table 5 demonstrate that offenders who 
travel from low to high income areas to commit crimes were less likely to receive a 
charge reduction relative to offenders who travel to other and similar-income 
locations, as well as offenders who did not travel.  Specifically, the odds of a charge 
reduction were reduced by 12% for low to high moving offenders compared to 
offenders who travel to commit crimes in other or similar-income areas and offenders 
who stayed in their home neighborhood to commit crimes.  Although offenders who 
travel from high to low income areas were in the predicted direction, high to low 
offenders were not statistically significantly related to charge reduced. 
                                                 
11 All predictors (i.e., legal variables, charging characteristics, statutory severity, offense type, prior 






Table 5. Logistic Regression Predicting the Log Odds of Charge Reduction for Low Home, High Home, and Offenders Who 
Travel (n = 59,685) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Independent Variables b (S.E.) Odds b (S.E.) Odds b (S.E.) Odds 
Low Home 0.07 (0.04) 1.07 0.07 (0.05) 1.07 0.06 (0.05) 1.07 
High Home -0.04 (0.04) 0.96 -0.07 (0.05) 0.94 -0.11 (0.05) 0.90** 
Low Arrest — — — 0.03 (0.04) 1.03 -0.02 (0.05) 0.98 
High Arrest — — — 0.07 (0.06) 1.07 0.04 (0.06) 1.04 
Low to High — — — -0.13 (0.06) 0.88** -0.26 (0.07) 0.77*** 
High to Low — — — 0.03 (0.09) 1.03 -0.03 (0.09) 0.97 
Traveled to Other — — — — — — -0.18 (0.04) 0.83*** 
Traveled to Similar — — — — — — -0.16 (0.03) 0.85*** 
Legal Variables          
   Pretrial Detention -0.76 (0.08) 0.47*** -0.75 (0.08) 0.47*** -0.76 (0.08) 0.47*** 
   Bench Warrant(s)  0.20 (0.04) 1.22*** 0.20 (0.04) 1.22*** 0.19 (0.04) 1.21*** 
   Prosecutor Caseload -0.001 (0.0001) 1.00*** -0.001 (0.0001) 1.00*** -0.001 (0.0001) 1.00*** 
   Private Counsel 0.40 (0.11) 1.50*** 0.41 (0.11) 1.50*** 0.41 (0.11) 1.50*** 
Charging Characteristics           
   Number of Charges 0.02 (0.02) 1.02 0.02 (0.02) 1.02 0.02 (0.02) 1.02 
   Number of Counts -0.01 (0.01) 0.99 -0.01 (0.01) 0.99 -0.01 (0.01) 0.99 
Statutory Severity          
   Class A Felony 2.42 (0.41) 11.25*** 2.42 (0.41) 11.22*** 2.42 (0.41) 11.22*** 
   Class B Felony 2.34 (0.35) 10.36*** 2.33 (0.36) 10.32*** 2.33 (0.36) 10.27*** 
   Class C Felony 2.24 (0.32) 9.36*** 2.23 (0.32) 9.33*** 2.23 (0.32) 9.34*** 
   Class D Felony 3.00 (0.37) 20.01*** 3.00 (0.37) 20.02*** 3.00 (0.37) 20.17*** 
   Class E Felony 3.11 (0.41) 22.49*** 3.11 (0.42) 22.50*** 3.12 (0.42) 22.66*** 
   Class A Misdemeanor 1.97 (0.25) 7.15*** 1.96 (0.25) 7.13*** 1.97 (0.26) 7.15*** 
   Class B Misdemeanor 1.80 (0.27) 6.05*** 1.80 (0.27) 6.03*** 1.79 (0.27) 6.01*** 
Offense Type          
   Person 0.01 (0.06) 1.01 0.01 (0.06) 1.01 -0.01 (0.06) 0.99 





   Drug -0.57 (0.06) 0.57*** -0.57 (0.05) 0.56*** -0.59 (0.06) 0.55*** 
Prior Record          
   Prior Arrest(s) -0.17 (0.03) 0.84*** -0.17 (0.03) 0.84*** -0.17 (0.03) 0.84*** 
   Prior Prison Sentence -0.42 (0.16) 0.66** -0.42 (0.16) 0.66** -0.42 (0.16) 0.66** 
Demographic Variables          
   Age -0.03 (0.005) 0.97*** -0.03 (0.005) 0.97*** -0.03 (0.005) 0.97*** 
   Male -0.30 (0.09) 0.74** -0.30 (0.09) 0.74** -0.30 (0.09) 0.74** 
   Black -0.27 (0.03) 0.76*** -0.28 (0.03) 0.76*** -0.27 (0.03) 0.76*** 
   Hispanic  -0.09 (0.03) 0.91** -0.10 (0.03) 0.91** -0.10 (0.03) 0.91** 
   Asian 1.26 (0.20) 3.53*** 1.26 (0.20) 3.54*** 1.25 (0.19) 3.48*** 
   Other -0.05 (0.28) 0.96 -0.05 (0.28) 0.95 -0.04 (0.28) 0.96 
  Constant 0.90 (0.11) 2.47** 0.90 (0.12) 2.45** 1.05 (0.14) 2.85*** 
 Note: ***p<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05 





The results of the third model in Table 5 demonstrate that the effect for 
offenders who travel from low to high income areas to commit crimes remain 
statistically significantly related to charge reduced and in the predicted negative 
direction relative to offenders who did not travel to different zip codes (i.e., stayed in 
their home neighborhood) to commit crimes.12  Moreover, the effect of low to high 
moving offenders increased in the negative direction with approximately 23% lower 
odds of a charge reduction compared to offenders who did not travel.  Also, offenders 
who travel (e.g., travel to other income locations and similar income locations) were 
less likely to receive a charge reduction compared to offenders who stayed in their 
home neighborhoods to commit crimes.  Offenders who travel to other income areas 
had approximately 17% lower odds of a charge reduction and offenders who travel to 
similar income areas had 15% lower odds of a charge reduction relative to offenders 
that did not travel.  Finally, offenders who travel from high to low-income 
neighborhoods to commit crimes were not significantly related to the dependent 
variable.  Overall, these results provide some support for the expectation that 
offenders from low income areas who travel to high income areas are less likely to 
receive charge reductions.  Findings are discussed and further elaborated upon in the 
final chapter.  
 
 
                                                 
12 Scholars have suggested that offenders travel to commit crimes in locations near or contiguous to 
their home neighborhood (see Bernasco and Block, 2009).  Additional analyses included a control for 





Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusions 
Overview 
Scholars state that there is theoretical support for differences in criminal 
punishment according to community context (Omori 2017; Williams and Rosenfeld, 
2016).  Recent empirical studies show defendant’s home and arrest neighborhood 
SES influences criminal punishment (Auerhahn et al., 2017; Omori, 2017; Williams 
and Rosenfeld, 2016; Wooldredge and Thistlethwaite, 2004).  However, these studies 
mostly focused on the relationship of either home or arrest neighborhood SES and 
final sentencing decisions.  No prior work considers the impact of both 
neighborhoods on prosecutorial decision-making.  This thesis examined the 
relationship of both home and arrest neighborhood SES on the likelihood of a 
defendant receiving a charge reduction. 
Interpretations of Findings 
 
Overall, the hypotheses are partially supported.  The first hypothesis states 
that offenders who reside in low income areas may be less likely to receive a charge 
reduction.  Although the results of bivariate analyses (not reported) supported this 
expectation, with offenders from low income areas being less likely to receive charge 
reductions compared to offenders from middle income areas, this relationship did not 
hold when other predictors were included in the model.  Therefore, I found no support 
for hypothesis one when other predictors of charge reductions were controlled which 
is inconsistent with theoretical reasoning in past literature (Harris, 1977, Harris and 
Hill, 1986; Sudnow, 1965; Suttles, 1972; Wooldredge, 2007).  For example, scholars 





susceptible to harsher punishment because of negative stereotypes (Wooldredge, 
2007).  Specifically, judges and prosecutors may view offenders from low-income or 
marginalized neighborhoods as dangerous, culpable, and threatening (Chambliss and 
Seidman, 1982; Liska, 1992).  Court actors may link these negative class stereotypes 
to offenders who reside in low-income neighborhoods which may lead to harsher 
treatment in sentencing and case processing (Omori, 2017; Williams and Rosenfeld, 
2016; Wooldredge, 2007; Wooldredge and Thistlewaite, 2004).  Bivariate analyses 
showed support for this extant literature with prosecutors being less likely to grant 
charge reductions; potentially stereotyping offenders who live in low-income areas.  
However, multivariate models did not support this argument and perhaps statistically 
significant variables such as offender’s race may be influencing the relationship 
between offenders from low-income areas and charge reductions.  Furthermore, it is 
also possible that prosecutors may not treat offenders from low-income locations 
more punitively or leniently because they are considered ‘typical’ offenders that 
receive the court’s going rate (Sudnow, 1965). 
The second hypothesis states that offenders who reside in high income areas 
may be more likely to receive a charge reduction.  Findings indicated that the second 
hypothesis was not supported, and this was the case in both bivariate and multivariate 
analyses.  There was no evidence that offenders from high income areas are more 
likely to receive charge reductions relative to middle income offenders.  Therefore, 
although bivariate analyses showed some theoretical support of disadvantages in 
charging decisions for offenders from low-income neighborhoods, I found no support 





outcomes in charging decisions.  These results do not comport with literature that 
suggests high-income individuals may be less culpable and more protected because 
they are part of the elite group in society (Chambliss and Seidman, 1971; Hawkins, 
1987; Liska, 1992; Spitzer, 1975) and not considered stereotypical offenders (Harris 
and Hill, 1986; Hill, et al., 1985; Sudnow, 1965; Suttles, 1972).  Overall, however, 
analyses did not support the prediction that prosecutors may attach more favorable 
views on offenders who reside in high-income locations (Williams and Rosenfeld, 
2016) which may reflect sparseness in these data with relatively few offenders 
residing in high-income areas. 
The third hypothesis states that offenders who reside in low-income areas and 
travel to high-income areas to commit crime may be less likely to receive a charge 
reduction.  The third hypothesis was supported with low to high moving offenders 
being significantly less likely to receive a charge reduction across all model 
specifications.  Low to high moving offenders had 23% lower odds of receiving a 
charge reduction relative to offenders who did not travel.13  These results are 
consistent with focal concerns, group threat processes, and typescript theory which 
suggest that offenders from low-income areas may be stereotyped as dangerous, 
threatening, and out of place in more protected high-income neighborhoods 
potentially leading to harsher punishments in prosecutorial decision-making 
(Chambliss and Seidman, 1971; Harris and Hill, 1986; Liska, 1992; Williams and 
                                                 
13 This finding is consistent with separate multilevel analyses and also found in both bivariate and 





Rosenfeld, 2016).  Therefore, support was provided for this extant literature with 
evidence of disadvantage in charge reductions for low to high moving offenders. 
The fourth hypothesis states that offenders who reside in high-income areas 
and travel to low-income areas to commit crime may be more likely to receive a 
charge reduction.  The fourth hypothesis was supported in bivariate analyses (not 
shown), but this relationship, although in the predicted direction in the second model, 
did not hold when other predictors were included in multivariate models.  Therefore, 
bivariate analyses show support for theoretical perspectives that suggest high to low 
offenders are treated leniently in case processing relative to offenders that do not 
travel (Harris, 1977; Hawkins, 1987; Kleck, 1981; Suttles, 1972).  For example, high-
income offenders may be protected by the elite (Liska, 1992; Williams and 
Rosenfeld, 2016) and are countertype to stereotypical low-income offenders (Harris, 
1977; Harris and Hill, 1986).  Additionally, crimes may be discounted when victims 
are lower-class individuals or members of the marginalized group (Hawkins, 1987; 
Kleck, 1981).  Thus, although bivariate analyses provided support for the prediction 
that offenders who reside in high-income locations and commit crimes in low-income 
areas may have advantages in charge reductions compared to offenders that stayed in 
their home neighborhoods to commit crimes, high to low moving offenders were not 
statistically significantly related to charge reductions in multivariate models.  Results 
may again reflect data limitations with too few high to low offenders available in 
these data.  Approximately 1.39% of offenders who live in high-income 






Limitations and Future Directions 
 
There were several limitations in this study.  First, t-tests suggested that cases 
with missing zip code information may be missing nonrandomly which could bias 
analyses.  Therefore, although the study sample was taken from the total population 
of cases in DANY from 2010-2011, utilizing listwise deletion to exclude cases with 
missing zip code information is not ideal.  It is possible that missing data may be due 
to homelessness or offenders who move regularly between short-term housing 
facilities.  However, these data do not provide this information and future work is 
needed to investigate the sources of missingness in additional detail and perhaps 
implement different missing data techniques such as multiple imputation.  
Furthermore, although zip codes in Manhattan are notably smaller than the average 
US zip code, census tracts would arguably be a better unit of analysis.  Also, the 
arrest zip code is used as a proxy for the crime-targeted neighborhood, so it is 
possible that offenders may have committed crimes in areas outside of the arrest 
neighborhood location.  In the future, researchers need to take greater care to collect 
data that includes both home, arrest, and crime-targeted neighborhood information.   
Second, these data are hierarchal with cases nested within home 
neighborhoods, crime-targeted neighborhoods, and DANY prosecutor offices.  
Supplemental multilevel analyses were examined to account for cases nested within 
home and crime-targeted neighborhoods; however, cases nested within prosecutor 
offices were not analyzed.  Given the multiple levels of analysis, and the complex 
ways that they overlap with one another, future research will be needed that replicates 





properly capture variation between the two prosecutor offices in Manhattan.  One 
promising approach might be to utilize cross-classified models (Johnson, 2012) that 
allow for multiple overlapping data structures to be analyzed simultaneously.  
Third, there may be an underlying relationship between offenders who travel 
to commit crimes in residential or commercial areas.  Literature points to crime 
concentrating at attractor locations (Block and Block 1995; Sherman, Gartin, and 
Buerger 1989) and scholars suggest there is a relationship with the distribution of 
crimes committed near crime attractors (Reid, Frank, Iwanski, Dabbaghian, and 
Brantingham, 2013).  For example, offenders traveling to these attractors move 
through neighborhoods where they become more aware of criminal opportunities 
(Reid et al., 2013).  Although the present study does not control for residential and 
commercial areas, it is important to note that offenders may recognize opportunities 
to commit crime at criminal nodes that exist between residential and commercial 
locations.  Additionally, offenders may commit crimes in different areas that are 
located next to their home neighborhood (Bernasco and Block, 2009).  To investigate 
this potential relationship in these data, a supplemental analysis was conducted using 
a dummy variable for crimes committed in contiguous zip codes as a proxy to identify 
whether crimes occurred in neighboring areas.  Findings showed a large amount of 
offender’s target zip codes next to their home zip code.  Therefore, future work can 
utilize GIS technology to look at exact locations and distance traveled between 
defendant’s home and crime-targeted areas and also identify whether crimes in 






Additionally, other factors may be correlated with charge reductions and 
offenders who travel to commit crimes in areas outside of their home neighborhood.  
For example, traveling offenders may disproportionately commit stranger offenses or 
crimes in which the victim is not an acquaintance, friend, family member, or intimate 
partner.  Traveling offenders committing crimes against strangers may have 
implications on prosecutorial charging decisions.  For example, Spohn and Holleran 
(2001) found prosecutors were more likely to file charges in cases involving stranger 
crimes, especially if the stranger used a weapon or the victim was white.  Thus, 
victim characteristics may be an underlying mechanism in this study and future work 
should consider the defendant’s relationship to the victim. 
Fifth, this study utilized median income-levels to identify neighborhood SES. 
Neighborhood income and individual-level income could not be properly 
distinguished with only private attorney as a crude proxy for individual level SES.  
For example, part of the effect captured in analyses may be that poor offenders live in 
lower-income areas.  Therefore, although it is a common limitation in the literature 
that studies lack proper measures for SES, it is particularly limiting for this study and 
scholars should continue to find ways to address this limitation (Zatz, 2000).  
Moreover, it is crucial to acknowledge ways that neighborhoods may vary other than 
income.  Sampson (2012) stated that neighborhood stratification, gentrification, and 
racial segregation have impacted urban neighborhoods and contributed to inequality 
in Chicago.  Similarities exist in New York City with increased gentrification in low-
income communities (NYU Furman Center, 2016), as well as racially and ethnically 





characteristics such as racial and ethnic neighborhood composition may matter more 
in prosecutorial decision-making.  For example, an individual from a minority 
community that commits crime in a predominately white neighborhood may have a 
stronger impact than income-level on charge reductions.  Future research could 
explore the potential relationship and interactions between these various 
neighborhood characteristics and criminal punishment. 
Finally, studies examining the influence of offender traits, mainly race and 
gender, on criminal punishment are often examined in isolation (Steffensmeier et al., 
2017; see also: McCall 2005).  However, scholars recognize individuals consist of a 
constellation of characteristics which impact societal labels (Steffensmeier, Painter-
Davis, and Ulmer, 2017).  For instance, research on intersectionality focuses on how 
social statuses intersect to create either harsher or lenient criminal punishments across 
groups (Steffensmeier et al., 2017; Steffensmeier et al., 1998; Warren, Chiricos, and 
Bales 2012).  Also, according to Sampson (2012) although “scripts” are important in 
recognizing differences across persons, it does not fully consider characteristics 
across social settings in neighborhoods where powerful effects exist in ecologically 
disadvantaged locations.  Therefore, it is possible that the effect of neighborhood SES 
on charging may interact with other defendant and community characteristics such as 
race, ethnicity, gender, employment, education, and other social traits.  For example, 
an employed Hispanic female from a low-income area who travels to commit crime 
in a predominately white and upper-class neighborhood may have different 







This thesis adds to the recent literature on community context and 
prosecutorial decision-making by being the first study to provide support for the 
ecological context of both the defendant’s home and crime-targeted neighborhood 
impacting charge reductions.  Specifically, findings show charge reductions were less 
likely for offenders who reside in low-income neighborhoods and travel to high-
income areas to commit crimes.  Also, offenders who travel to other and same-
income neighborhoods to commit crime generally seemed to be disadvantaged in 
charging decisions.  These findings have implications on social inequality and 
contextual level disparities in criminal punishment. 
First, findings indicated that there are broader processes taking place within 
these findings not just for offenders who travel from low to high income locations, 
but also people who travel to different and similar income locations to commit 
crimes.  In other words, situational characteristics include not only the socioeconomic 
status of the neighborhood, but individual level processes that are related to how, 
when, and why offenders travel to different neighborhoods.  For example, prosecutors 
may scrutinize offenders who travel outside of their home neighborhoods to commit 
crimes because these offenders stand out as countertypes (Harris, 1977) who are more 
motivated (Felson and Cohen, 1980) to engage in criminal activity which may impact 
focal concerns in charging decisions.  For instance, offenders who travel to buy drugs 
may be viewed differently from offenders who travel to different areas to sell drugs.  
Therefore, although this study found offenders who travel from low to high-income 





be interpreted with caution because individual-level characteristics that add more 
context to the complexities of offenders who travel and their impact on prosecutorial 
charging decisions such as the cost or harm done to the victim and the various crimes 
within each offense type are not completely captured in this study. 
In sum, the criminal justice system responds to the SES of both the offender 
and victim within ecological contexts (Forman, 2017; Laub, 2014; Pfaff, 2017; 
Sampson, 2012; Wacquant, 2000) and the structure and location of communities may 
influence how low-income individuals are stereotyped and treated by criminal justice 
actors (Forman, 2017; Pfaff, 2017; Wacquant, 2000).  In sentencing research, 
minority offenders are noted as being disadvantaged in criminal punishment 
(Kutateladze et al., 2014).  However, Forman (2017) alluded to the idea that class 
differences may condition race differences when he discussed the history of criminal 
justice responses in poor black neighborhoods in the US.  For example, 
predominately middle and upper-class judges, prosecutors, and political leaders took 
increased punitive stances toward black offenders from lower-class areas as one way 
to prevent the deterioration of poor black neighborhoods.  Still, more research is 
needed to review the separate and interactive contextual effects of race and income in 
case processing and sentencing.  Overall, future work can review social inequality in 
punishment by identifying potential disadvantages not only for offenders from low-
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